H.R.8283 Deterring American AI Model Theft Act of 2026

Requires the U.S. government to assess and address threats from model extraction attacks on closed-source AI models by foreign adversaries. Instructs the Secretary of State and Commerce to identify threats, publish attackers, and consult stakeholders. Allows sanctions and public guidance to deter attacks.

  • Authority: United States Congress
  • Parent authority: Federal government
  • Jurisdiction: United States
  • Collections: U.S. federal laws
  • Most recent activity: Proposed
  • Most recent activity date: 2026-04-22

Risk subdomain coverage

Good coverage — Comprehensive governance measures or mitigations with clear procedures relating to the risk subdomain are explicitly described.

  • AI system security vulnerabilities
  • Cyberattacks, weapon development or use
  • Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation
  • Competitive dynamics

Minimal coverage — Brief mention but no specific mitigations, recommendations or governance measures relating to the risk subdomain are described.

  • Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale
  • AI possessing dangerous capabilities

All other risk subdomains had no coverage in this document.

Risk Coverage Summary

The document has good coverage of approximately 5 subdomains, with strong focus on AI system security (2.2), malicious actors conducting cyberattacks and fraud (4.2, 4.3), and competitive dynamics (6.4). Coverage is concentrated in security, threat prevention, and protecting US competitiveness against foreign adversaries conducting model extraction attacks.

Sector coverage

Good coverage — Comprehensive governance measures or mitigations with clear procedures relating to the sector are explicitly described.

  • Information
  • Scientific Research & Development Services
  • National Security

Minimal coverage — Brief mention but no specific mitigations, recommendations or governance measures relating to the sector are described.

  • Professional & Technical Services

All other sectors had no coverage in this document.

Sectors Summary

The document primarily governs the Information and Scientific Research and Development Services sectors, where AI model developers and owners operate. It also has strong implications for National Security as it addresses foreign adversary threats to US national security interests through AI model theft. The Professional and Technical Services sector is minimally mentioned through consultation requirements.

Legislative Status

Hard Law

Legislative Status Summary

This is a binding legislative act from the United States Congress with mandatory obligations, enforcement mechanisms including sanctions and penalties, and specific requirements for government agencies to assess threats, publish lists, and impose sanctions on violators.

Actors

Proposer

  • Entity Types: AI_Governance_Actor
  • Entities: United States Congress; Senate; House of Representatives
  • Summary: The document is a Congressional bill introduced by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, as stated in the enactment clause.

Target

  • Entity Types: AI_Developer, AI_Governance_Actor
  • Entities: United States private sector companies (owners of closed-source AI models); entities of concern; foreign adversaries (People's Republic of China including Hong Kong and Macau, Russian Federation); fraudulent account network providers
  • Summary: The document primarily targets foreign entities conducting model extraction attacks while also imposing obligations on US government agencies. It defines 'owner' as US persons holding IP rights to closed-source AI models, and 'entities of concern' as foreign persons in countries of concern conducting attacks. The bill creates obligations for both the attackers (through sanctions) and US government agencies (through assessment and reporting requirements).

Enforcer

  • Entity Types: AI_Governance_Actor
  • Entities: Secretary of State; Secretary of Commerce; Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security; Operating Committee for Export Policy; End-User Review Committee; Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce; President of the United States
  • Summary: Multiple government officials and bodies are designated with enforcement authority, including the Secretary of State for sanctions, the Secretary of Commerce for assessments and reporting, and the Under Secretary of Commerce for Entity List additions. The President has authority to block transactions under IEEPA.

Monitor

  • Entity Types: AI_Governance_Actor
  • Entities: Secretary of Commerce; Operating Committee for Export Policy; Department of Commerce; Secretary of State
  • Summary: The Secretary of Commerce, coordinating with the Operating Committee, is tasked with conducting assessments, routine monitoring, maintaining information sharing mechanisms, and submitting annual reports. The Secretary of State maintains and publishes the AI Model Extraction Attackers List.

AI Lifecycle Stages

Lifecycle stages covered by the documents, as defined in the OECD Framework for the Classification of AI Systems

  • Build and Use Model
  • Deploy
  • Operate and Monitor

AI Lifecycle Summary

The document primarily addresses the deployment and operation stages of AI systems, focusing on protecting deployed closed-source AI models from unauthorized extraction. It extensively covers operational monitoring for model extraction attacks, access controls during deployment, and the security of models in use. The document does not significantly address earlier lifecycle stages like planning, data collection, or initial model building.

Technical Scope

Terms relating to technical scope that are mentioned or implicitly referenced in the document

  • AI Models
  • Open Weight / Open Source

Technical Scope Summary

The document explicitly and extensively discusses AI models, particularly closed-source AI models, as the primary focus. It defines closed-source AI models in detail, focusing on proprietary model weights and architectures. The document does not mention frontier AI, general purpose AI, foundation models, generative AI, predictive AI, or compute thresholds. It does not explicitly distinguish between open-weight and closed-source models but focuses exclusively on closed-source.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8283/text
https://agora.eto.tech/instrument/6781
Explore in the Document View

Document data from AGORA, CSET Emerging Technology Observatory.