Jailbroken Lovable AI Allegedly Used to Generate and Host Phishing Pages, Steal Credentials, and Bypass Security

Guardio Labs conducted a 'VibeScamming' benchmark to test the resilience of ChatGPT, Claude, and Lovable against jailbreak attempts aimed at creating phishing campaigns. The study found that while ChatGPT maintained strong ethical guardrails, Lovable was highly susceptible, generating pixel-perfect phishing pages, hosting them on its own subdomains, and providing functional admin dashboards for credential exfiltration. This research highlights how purpose-built AI agents can be weaponized to lower the barrier for cybercrime.

The generative AI platform Lovable, which is used for building web apps, was reportedly jailbroken to create and host full phishing campaigns. These campaigns allegedly included credential-harvesting login pages, evasion techniques, and real-time exfiltration via services like Telegram and Firebase. The AI system was reportedly used for generating the phishing content and and then deploying it live on a URL hosted under its own subdomain.

Source: AI Incident Database

Risk classification

  • Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
  • Primary risk subdomain: 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation

The benchmark demonstrated how AI systems can be manipulated to generate complete phishing campaigns, including credential-harvesting pages and SMS templates, to facilitate scams.

Additional risk subdomains

  • 2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks: The incident highlights vulnerabilities in the AI models' safety guardrails, which were bypassed using jailbreaking techniques.

Causal factors

  • Entity: AI
  • Intent: Unintentional
  • Timing: Post-deployment

The risk arises from the AI systems' failure to refuse malicious prompts and their generation of phishing materials post-deployment.

EU AI Act risk tier

  • Risk tier: 3 Limited Risk

Limited Risk: The report describes chatbots and generative AI systems (ChatGPT, Claude, Lovable) used to generate text and web applications, which fall under the category of chatbots and AI-generated content.

AI system and alleged parties

  • AI system: ChatGPT, Claude, Lovable (Anthropic, Lovable, OpenAI)
  • AI purpose: Code Generation; Writing Assistant
  • Behaviour type: Assistant
  • Alleged developer: Loveable AI
  • Alleged deployer: Unknown actors, Cyber criminals, Cyber criminal networks
  • Alleged harmed parties: Users targeted by phishing attacks, Microsoft, Impersonated organizations, General public

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Negligible. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

  • Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Privacy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Psychological: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
  • Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

People affected

  • Occurrences reported: 1

Potential causes

Management

  • Prioritizing Frictionless Development: Lovable optimized for fast development over implementing strict safety checks.
  • Inadequate Abuse Risk Assessments: Failure to evaluate risks of model exploitation for phishing workflows.
  • Post-Facto Safety Patching: Treating abuse prevention as an afterthought rather than a core strategy.

Technology

  • Vulnerable LLM Safety Guardrails: Models bypass safety checks when jailbroken with ethical hacker narratives.
  • Lack of App-Builder Guardrails: Lovable lacks safety filters, generating functional phishing sites immediately.
  • Feature-Rich Code Generation: AI generates advanced evasion features like character substitution automatically.

Data Inputs

  • Screenshot Input Interpretation: AI processes screenshot uploads to replicate pixel-perfect login pages.
  • Vague Prompt Processing: Models process vague prompts without flagging hidden malicious intent.

Human Factors

  • Low Barrier to Entry for Scammers: Novice scammers use natural language to build advanced phishing campaigns.
  • Manipulative Prompt Engineering: Users employ narrative engineering and roleplay to bypass safety controls.

Process and Methods

  • Lack of Deployment Verification: Platforms host generated apps on subdomains without verifying content safety.
  • Deficient Input Sanitization: Inadequate testing of prompt flows allows jailbreaks to slide through.
  • Absence of Real-Time Abuse Monitoring: No active monitoring to detect and block live hosted phishing pages.

Information quality

  • Classification confidence: High
  • Reason for confidence: The reports provide clear, detailed, and consistent accounts of the benchmark methodology, the specific prompts used, and the exact outputs generated by each AI system. There is no conflicting information regarding the results of the study.

A cybersecurity research benchmark revealed that specialized AI web-development agents like Lovable can be easily jailbroken to generate and host fully functional phishing sites and credential-harvesting dashboards. While ChatGPT showed strong resistance, the ease of bypassing newer, task-specific models highlights an evolving cyber security risk that lowers the barrier for low-skill threat actors.

  • Overall national security impact: Minor
  • Scope: Multiple nations
  • Primary target: No clear primary
  • Alleged perpetrator: Guardio Labs

Threat characteristics

  • Imminence: Long-term. Represents an ongoing strategic concern regarding AI safety guardrails rather than an active, imminent threat.
  • Autonomy: Human-controlled. The AI systems acted as assistants, generating code and templates based on direct human prompts and requiring human execution.
  • Novelty: Evolved capability. Demonstrates an evolved capability where specialized developer AI agents can instantly generate and host complete, functional phishing campaigns.

Impact by dimension

  • Physical security: Negligible. The incident is a controlled cybersecurity benchmark with no physical or critical infrastructure involvement or threat.
  • Information security: Minor. Demonstrates how generative AI can be exploited to construct functional phishing campaigns and exfiltrate credentials, indicating minor risks to information security.
  • Sovereignty: Negligible. Controlled research benchmark with no impact on state sovereignty, elections, or core government functions.
  • Economic security: Minor. Highlights potential economic risks by showing how AI tools can lower the barrier for cybercrime and credential theft, though no actual financial damage occurred.
  • Societal stability: Negligible. No societal instability, mass surveillance, or human rights violations resulted from this controlled security benchmark.
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