Reported Deepfakes of Ukrainian Deputy PM Olha Stefanishyna Allegedly Supporting Fictional Mobilization Plan for Women

In late June 2025, Russian Telegram channels reportedly circulated deepfake videos claiming that Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna backed mandatory mobilization of up to one million Ukrainian women starting September 1. Officials reportedly debunked the claim, confirming no such plans or laws exist. The disinformation operation reportedly aimed to incite panic and destabilize Ukraine's domestic situation.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
• Primary risk subdomain: 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale

The incident involves a coordinated, state-aligned disinformation campaign using synthetic media to influence public opinion and destabilize a population at scale.

Additional risk subdomains

• 3.1 False or misleading information: The campaign relied on generating and spreading false deepfake videos and fabricated claims to mislead the public.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The incident was driven by human actors (Russian propagandists) intentionally deploying deepfake technology to achieve a specific geopolitical goal.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 3 Limited Risk

Limited Risk: The report describes the use of AI-generated content (deepfakes), which falls under Limited Risk (Level 3) and requires specific transparency obligations to ensure users are informed of the AI's nature.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: None named
• AI purpose: Deepfake Video Generation; Social Media Content Generation
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Unknown voice cloning technology developers, Unknown deepfake technology developers
• Alleged deployer: Russian Telegram channels, Russian disinformation channels, Government of Russia-aligned actors
• Alleged harmed parties: Women of Ukraine, Truth, Olha Stefanishnyna, National security and intelligence stakeholders, Government of Ukraine, General public of Ukraine, Epistemic integrity

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Negligible, indirect Minor
• Epistemic: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Malicious content

Reported: Yes, the reports describe deepfake videos created and spread as part of a malicious propaganda operation.

Directly caused: Deepfake videos of Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna were created and disseminated on Russian Telegram channels.

Inferred additional harm: The deepfake videos likely reached tens of thousands of viewers across various social media platforms before being flagged as fake.

Democracy

Reported: Yes, the reports describe an information operation designed to destabilize the Ukrainian home front.

Directly caused: The deepfakes targeted a high-ranking government official, Olha Stefanishyna, falsely attributing statements to her to undermine state mobilization policies.

Inferred additional harm: Such coordinated disinformation campaigns erode public trust in democratic institutions and official government communications during wartime.

Psychological

Reported: Yes, the reports state the campaign aimed to 'sow panic among Ukrainians'.

Indirectly caused: The spread of mobilization rumors and travel ban deepfakes was designed to cause panic and anxiety among the Ukrainian public.

Inferred additional harm: It is highly likely that thousands of Ukrainian women and their families experienced acute anxiety and distress upon viewing the deepfakes before they were debunked.

Epistemic

Reported: Yes, the reports describe the spread of fabricated video evidence and false claims about mandatory mobilization of women.

Directly caused: A deepfake video was fabricated to show the Deputy Prime Minister proposing a travel ban on young women, creating false evidence of a non-existent policy.

Inferred additional harm: The incident contributes to a broader degradation of the information ecosystem where citizens struggle to distinguish real official announcements from synthetic fakes.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly harmed: 1
• People reportedly exposed: 1

Potential causes

Management

• Adversary Information Warfare: Russian propagandists managed the deployment of AI to sow domestic panic.

Technology

• Deepfake Generation Tools: AI tools enabled creation of realistic fake videos of the Deputy Minister.
• Algorithmic Amplification: Telegram algorithms facilitated rapid spread of the deepfake video.

Data Inputs

• Source Video Exploitation: Authentic media of the official was used to train the deepfake model.

Human Factors

• User Credulity: Panic led users to believe and share unverified synthetic videos.

Process and Methods

• Inadequate Platform Moderation: Telegram lacked proactive detection and removal of malicious deepfakes.

Regulatory Environment

• Lack of AI Governance: No strict regulations exist to prevent hostile state use of deepfakes.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The reports clearly outline the nature of the incident: a state-sponsored disinformation campaign using deepfakes of a specific political figure to sow panic. The role of AI (deepfake video generation) is explicit, and the political context is well-defined. There is little ambiguity regarding the intent or the primary domain classification.
• Ambiguities identified: The specific AI tool or platform used to generate the deepfake is not identified.
• Alternative interpretations: None. The incident is a clear-cut case of geopolitical disinformation using synthetic media.

Russian propaganda channels deployed deepfake videos of Ukrainian Deputy PM Olha Stefanishyna to falsely claim mandatory mobilization of young women. This coordinated state-aligned information operation aimed to destabilize the home front and erode trust in government institutions, representing a severe information warfare threat during an active conflict.

• Overall national security impact: Severe
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: Ukraine
• Alleged perpetrator: Russia

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Immediate. The rapid spread of panic-inducing mobilization rumors requires immediate counter-disinformation response within hours to prevent public destabilization.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The AI was used purely as a generation tool by human propagandists who directed the creation and dissemination of the content.
• Novelty: Evolved capability. While deepfakes are an established threat, targeting high-level wartime ministers to manipulate military mobilization represents an advanced application of the technology.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. No physical assets, critical infrastructure, or kinetic systems were targeted or affected in this incident.
• Information security: Severe. State-sponsored information warfare campaign utilizing sophisticated deepfakes of a high-ranking official to spread false mobilization narratives during an active military conflict, requiring coordinated government debunking.
• Sovereignty: Substantial. The campaign directly targeted government credibility and mobilization policies, attempting to disrupt state authority and public trust in official communications during wartime.
• Economic security: Negligible. No significant economic infrastructure, financial systems, or strategic technological assets were compromised.
• Societal stability: Substantial. Designed to sow widespread panic and anxiety among the civilian population regarding mandatory military service and travel restrictions, threatening home front stability.