Purportedly AI-Generated TikTok Videos Reportedly Urged 'Polexit' Campaign, Prompting Polish Government Complaint to EU

Purportedly AI-generated TikTok videos depicting young women in patriotic dress reportedly urged Poland to leave the EU ("Polexit") and spread widely in late December 2025. Poland's junior digital minister reportedly said the wave appeared to test narratives ahead of the 2027 election, and asked the European Commission to examine TikTok's DSA compliance. TikTok reportedly said it removed content that violated its rules.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
• Primary risk subdomain: 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale

The incident involves a coordinated campaign using AI-generated videos to spread political disinformation and influence public opinion ahead of Poland's 2027 elections.

Additional risk subdomains

• 3.1 False or misleading information: The campaign utilized AI-generated videos to spread false or misleading political narratives about Poland leaving the EU.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The risk was caused by human actors who intentionally created and deployed AI-generated videos to conduct a political disinformation campaign.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 3 Limited Risk

Limited Risk: The incident involves AI-generated deepfakes, which under the EU AI Act require transparency obligations to inform users that the content is synthetic.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: None named
• AI purpose: Deepfake Video Generation; Social Media Content Generation
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Unknown voice cloning technology developers, Unknown deepfake technology developers
• Alleged deployer: Unknown disinformation actors
• Alleged harmed parties: Polish voters, General public of Poland, Epistemic integrity, Electoral integrity

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Minor, indirect Minor
• Privacy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Malicious content

Reported: The report explicitly describes the creation and spread of AI-generated videos delivering far-right messages promoting Poland's departure from the EU.

Directly caused: AI-generated videos of young women in patriotic dress delivering far-right messages were created and spread on TikTok.

Inferred additional harm: It is likely that similar AI-generated political disinformation videos were created and distributed across other social media platforms during this campaign.

Democracy

Reported: The report explicitly describes an attempt to influence Poland's 2027 parliamentary elections and divide Polish society using AI-generated disinformation.

Directly caused: The campaign used AI-generated videos to test political narratives and probe how the upcoming 2027 election can be influenced.

Indirectly caused: The campaign aimed to divide Polish society and increase political tensions by zoning in on hot-button issues like Polexit.

Inferred additional harm: Continued use of such campaigns could lead to broader erosion of trust in democratic processes and institutions among the Polish electorate.

Epistemic

Reported: The report explicitly describes the spread of AI-generated disinformation videos designed to test political narratives and mislead the public.

Directly caused: AI-generated videos promoting Polexit were distributed on TikTok, gaining quick traction and spreading misleading political narratives.

Inferred additional harm: The proliferation of realistic AI-generated political presenters makes it harder for the public to distinguish between authentic political discourse and synthetic foreign influence campaigns.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1

Potential causes

Management

• Inadequate Risk Assessment: TikTok failed to anticipate AI-driven election interference on its platform.
• Slow Root Cause Investigation: Platform struggled to trace the origin and creators of the AI campaign.

Technology

• AI Video Generation Tools: Allowed easy creation of realistic deepfake-style videos of patriotic women.
• Recommendation Algorithm Exploitation: Algorithms prioritized sensational political content, aiding rapid spread.

Data Inputs

• Lack of Provenance Metadata: Uploaded videos lacked metadata verifying AI origin or synthetic nature.
• Targeted Narrative Data: Used divisive local political themes to maximize audience engagement.

Human Factors

• User Susceptibility: Viewers easily influenced by realistic AI-generated patriotic personas.
• Malicious Actor Intent: Foreign actors sought to test narratives and divide Polish society.

Process and Methods

• Inadequate Proactive Detection: TikTok lacked automated tools to flag synthetic political disinformation early.
• Reactive Moderation Process: Content was only removed after government escalation rather than proactively.

Regulatory Environment

• Lagging DSA Enforcement: DSA compliance frameworks were not yet fully preventing such campaigns.
• Lack of AI Disinformation Laws: Absence of strict legal penalties for deploying synthetic political campaigns.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: Medium
• Reason for confidence: The report clearly describes the political context and the government's response, but the specific AI tools used and the identity of the actors behind the campaign remain unconfirmed.
• Ambiguities identified: The exact AI technology used to generate the videos is not specified, and the creators of the campaign have not been identified.
• Alternative interpretations: The videos could be interpreted as organic political expression rather than a coordinated foreign disinformation campaign, though government officials suspect the latter.
• Missing information: The specific AI models used to generate the videos, the identity of the creators, and quantitative data on the reach and engagement of the videos on TikTok.

In late December 2025, a suspected foreign-aligned disinformation campaign utilized AI-generated TikTok videos to promote Poland's exit from the EU. Described by Polish officials as a test of political narratives ahead of the 2027 elections, the incident highlights the evolving threat of synthetic media in foreign influence operations targeting democratic processes.

• Overall national security impact: Substantial
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: Poland
• Alleged perpetrator: Unknown

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The campaign targets the 2027 parliamentary elections, representing a strategic, long-term threat rather than an immediate operational crisis.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The AI systems were used as tools by human operators to generate synthetic video content, with no autonomous decision-making or execution by the AI itself.
• Novelty: Evolved capability. While political disinformation campaigns are established threats, the use of realistic AI-generated presenters to test and optimize divisive narratives represents an evolved capability.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. No physical threats, kinetic attacks, or critical infrastructure issues were reported in connection with this incident.
• Information security: Substantial. The incident involves a coordinated, AI-enhanced disinformation campaign using deepfake videos to influence political narratives and public opinion, prompting official concern and a European Commission investigation.
• Sovereignty: Minor. The campaign represents an early-stage attempt to probe and manipulate Polish electoral processes ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections, though no core government systems were compromised.
• Economic security: Negligible. No threats to financial systems, strategic technologies, or economic stability were reported.
• Societal stability: Minor. The campaign aimed to divide Polish society and increase political tensions, but the immediate impact was limited and the content was quickly removed by TikTok.