Former Costa Mesa, California, Police Officer Reportedly Used Flock Safety License-Plate Reader System to Track Woman He Was Seeing and Her Romantic Partners

Orange County prosecutors said Costa Mesa, California, police officer Robert Jay Josett used the department's Flock Safety license-plate reader system between 2023 and 2024 to locate a woman he was seeing and vehicles belonging to her romantic partners, including after he was placed on leave. In 2026, Josett pleaded guilty to misdemeanor unauthorized computer access and fraud, repeated phone calls, and contempt of court.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 2 Privacy & Security
• Primary risk subdomain: 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information

The officer abused the FLOCK license plate reader system to track the physical locations and movements of private individuals without their consent, violating their privacy.

Additional risk subdomains

• 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation: The perpetrator used the system to stalk, harass, and threaten to leak explicit photos of his mistress to gain personal advantage and control over her.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The risk and harm were caused by the intentional decision of a human user to abuse his authorized access to the FLOCK license plate reader system for personal tracking.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 2 High Risk

High Risk: The FLOCK system is used in law enforcement applications, specifically for tracking and surveillance, which has significant implications for fundamental rights and public safety.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: Flock Safety license-plate reader system (Flock Safety)
• AI purpose: License Plate Recognition; Smart Surveillance
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Surveillance technology developers, Flock Safety, Automated license plate reader (ALPR) developers
• Alleged deployer: Stalkers, Robert Jay Josett, Law enforcement, Costa Mesa Police Department (California)
• Alleged harmed parties: Woman and romantic partners tracked by Robert Jay Josett, Victims of stalking, Privacy, Individuals whose license plate data were accessed for non-law-enforcement purposes

Harm severity

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Civil rights

Reported: The report explicitly describes violations of civil rights through unauthorized tracking and stalking.

Directly caused: The victims' rights to privacy and freedom from harassment were violated by the officer's unauthorized tracking using police systems.

Indirectly caused: N/A

Inferred additional harm: N/A

Privacy

Reported: The report explicitly describes severe privacy violations through unauthorized tracking of location data.

Directly caused: The officer violated the privacy of his mistress, her romantic partners, and his wife by tracking their vehicles and locations using the FLOCK license plate reader system.

Indirectly caused: N/A

Inferred additional harm: N/A

Psychological

Reported: The report explicitly describes severe psychological distress and fear resulting from the stalking and tracking behavior.

Directly caused: The mistress experienced severe distress and fear, described by the District Attorney as 'frightening' and 'dangerous' after being contacted thousands of times and tracked.

Indirectly caused: N/A

Inferred additional harm: The mistress' new boyfriend and the officer's wife likely suffered significant anxiety, distress, and fear upon learning they were being tracked using police databases.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly harmed: 3
• People reportedly exposed: 3

Potential causes

Management

• Insufficient System Auditing: Management failed to detect thirteen unauthorized database inquiries over months.
• Delayed Credential Revocation: Management did not immediately revoke system access when placing officer on leave.

Technology

• FLOCK System Vulnerability: The FLOCK license plate reader system was vulnerable to unauthorized tracking.
• CLETS Database Access: The state law enforcement database allowed unauthorized personal inquiries.

Data Inputs

• Real-time Vehicle Location Data: Continuous license plate reader data enabled tracking of victims' movements.
• Confidential Personal Records: Access to database records provided personal information on target individuals.

Human Factors

• Officer Obsessive Behavior: The officer used his professional authority to stalk and harass his mistress.
• Abuse of Authority: The officer used his position to access restricted databases for personal reasons.

Process and Methods

• Lack of Real-time Access Alerts: The system failed to flag or block inquiries unrelated to active investigations.
• Inadequate Post-Suspension Lockout: The officer retained FLOCK system access even after being placed on leave.

Regulatory Environment

• Inadequate Database Compliance: State and local regulations failed to prevent misuse of sensitive databases.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The report is an official press release from the Orange County District Attorney's office detailing a guilty plea, providing highly reliable factual details about the systems used and the actions taken.

A former local police officer pleaded guilty to abusing law enforcement databases and the FLOCK license plate reader system to stalk his mistress and others. While representing a serious abuse of authority and privacy violation for the individuals involved, the national security impact is minor and managed through standard local judicial and administrative procedures.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Response level: Moderate
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: United States
• Alleged perpetrator: Individual

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The perpetrator has pleaded guilty and been sentenced, making this a resolved local criminal matter with no active or immediate national threat.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The FLOCK license plate reader system acted purely as a tool queried directly by the human user to retrieve specific vehicle location data.
• Novelty: Established threat. Insider abuse of police databases and surveillance tools for personal tracking is a well-documented and established threat category.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. The incident involves local law enforcement database abuse for personal stalking and does not affect physical critical infrastructure or national defense systems.
• Information security: Minor. Authorized law enforcement systems (CLETS and FLOCK) were compromised via insider abuse, representing a minor security breach of local police intelligence data but no national security intelligence compromise.
• Sovereignty: Minor. An officer abused public office and municipal law enforcement systems, undermining local government integrity and public trust, but without disrupting national sovereignty or constitutional processes.
• Economic security: Negligible. No strategic technologies, critical supply chains, or financial systems were targeted or compromised in this incident.
• Societal stability: Minor. The incident involved localized violations of civil liberties and privacy rights of three individuals, but did not scale to population-level social manipulation or mass human rights abuses.