Milwaukee Police Detective Allegedly Used Flock Safety License-Plate Reader 20 Times to Track Two People in Violation of Department Policy

A Milwaukee County criminal complaint alleges that Police Detective Tehrangi Chapman used Flock Safety license-plate readers 20 times to track two people from January 2024 to January 2025, entering "test" or "training" as search reasons. The complaint says Chapman later admitted using Flock to track both people in violation of Milwaukee Police Department policy. He was charged with misconduct in public office; a separate count concerned an unauthorized GPS tracker.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
• Primary risk subdomain: 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation

The detective used the Flock Safety system to stalk and track specific victims for personal reasons, representing a targeted exploitation and abuse of power for personal advantage.

Additional risk subdomains

• 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information: The system was used to obtain non-public, highly sensitive location and movement data of private individuals without their consent.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The incident was caused by a human operator (a police detective) intentionally misusing a deployed AI-powered surveillance system for unauthorized personal tracking.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 2 High Risk

High Risk: The system is an automated license plate reader used in law enforcement applications, which is explicitly classified as high-risk under the EU AI Act.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: Flock license-plate reader system (Flock Safety)
• AI purpose: License Plate Recognition; Camera Tracking
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Surveillance technology developers, Flock Safety, Automated license plate reader (ALPR) developers
• Alleged deployer: Tehrangi Chapman, Police departments in the United States, Milwaukee Police Department, Law enforcement
• Alleged harmed parties: Victim three in Tehrangi Chapman investigation, Victim four in Tehrangi Chapman investigation, Privacy, Individuals subjected to unauthorized surveillance

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Minor, indirect Minor
• Psychological: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Privacy

Reported: The report explicitly describes severe privacy violations, with the detective using the license plate reader system and a physical GPS device to track victims' locations without consent.

Directly caused: The detective violated the privacy of Victim Three and Victim Four by tracking their movements using the Flock ALPR system 20 times and installing an unauthorized GPS tracker.

Indirectly caused: Officer Ayala violated the privacy of Victim One and Victim Two by tracking them over 200 times using the same system.

Inferred additional harm: The ease with which officers bypassed audit logs by typing 'training' or 'test' suggests that other citizens' private location data may have been accessed without proper authorization.

Psychological

Reported: The report explicitly describes psychological harm, noting that Victim Four felt paranoid and was visibly shaken by the stalking and investigation.

Directly caused: Victim Four experienced paranoia and was visibly shaken due to being tracked and spied on by the detective.

Inferred additional harm: It is highly likely that the other tracked individuals (Victims One, Two, and Three) also experienced distress, anxiety, or paranoia upon learning they were being unlawfully tracked by police officers.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 2
• People reportedly harmed: 4
• People reportedly exposed: 4

Potential causes

Management

• Failure of Internal Accountability: Internal Affairs division failed to preemptively detect rogue behavior.
• Delayed Action on System Abuse: Policy enforcement occurred after multiple officers had already abused data.

Technology

• ALPR System Functionality: Flock Safety cameras continuously capture and store searchable location data.
• Commercial GPS Tracking Devices: Commercially available Optimus GPS trackers allowed unauthorized vehicle tracking.

Data Inputs

• Falsified Search Justifications: Officer entered false reasons like 'training' or 'test' to run searches.

Human Factors

• Intentional Abuse of Power: Detective tracked individuals for personal reasons, ignoring privacy boundaries.
• Stalking and Harassment Motives: Detective installed GPS trackers and queried ALPR to monitor victims.
• Double Standard in Ethics: Internal affairs investigator abused system while investigating another's abuse.

Process and Methods

• Weak Initial Audit Systems: Audits were only triggered retroactively after high-profile abuse scandals.
• Superficial Validation of Queries: System accepted generic terms like 'training' without active validation.
• Inadequate Access Controls: Individual credentials allowed unrestricted searches without real-time approval.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The assessment is based on highly detailed legal documents, including a formal criminal complaint with specific dates, counts, victim designations, and audit details, leaving very little ambiguity about the facts of the misuse.

A Milwaukee police detective misused the department's Flock Safety license plate reader system to stalk individuals for personal reasons. While representing a serious abuse of authority and violation of civil liberties, the incident is a localized law enforcement misconduct issue with minor national security implications.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: United States
• Alleged perpetrator: Tehrangi N. Chapman

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The specific perpetrator has been suspended and criminally charged, meaning there is no immediate ongoing threat, though insider misuse of surveillance remains a long-term oversight concern.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The AI-enabled license plate reader system acted purely as a tool queried and manipulated by a human operator who initiated the unauthorized searches.
• Novelty: Established threat. Insider abuse of police databases and surveillance tools for personal reasons is a well-documented, established threat vector.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. The incident involves localized stalking using a license plate database and a GPS tracker, presenting no threat to critical physical infrastructure or national security targeting systems.
• Information security: Minor. While a law enforcement database was compromised for personal tracking, it did not involve classified national intelligence systems, foreign espionage, or state-sponsored information warfare.
• Sovereignty: Minor. The incident compromised the integrity of local police internal affairs accountability, but it did not threaten federal sovereignty, borders, or core national constitutional processes.
• Economic security: Negligible. The financial impact is limited to municipal-level contract cancellations with Flock Safety, presenting no threat to national economic stability or strategic technological advantages.
• Societal stability: Minor. The civil and privacy rights of specific individuals were violated by police officers, causing local civil rights groups to raise concerns, but it did not lead to large-scale societal instability or systemic mass oppression.