Former Coffee County, Georgia, Deputy Allegedly Used Flock Safety License-Plate Reader System to Track Woman

Coffee County, Georgia, prosecutors allege former sheriff's deputy Chris Ashley Rozar used the department's Flock Safety license-plate reader system and other law-enforcement databases for personal purposes, including tracking and surveilling a woman without her consent in April–May 2024. A 2026 grand-jury indictment charged him with stalking, computer invasion of privacy, misuse of captured license-plate data, and violation of oath.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
• Primary risk subdomain: 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation

The deputy used the automated surveillance system to target, track, and stalk a specific victim for personal harassment, which fits targeted exploitation and harassment under boundary rule B1.

Additional risk subdomains

• 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information: The perpetrator misused law enforcement databases to obtain private, non-public location and license plate tracking data of the victim without her consent.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The incident was caused by a human law enforcement officer intentionally misusing a deployed license plate recognition system for personal stalking and harassment.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 2 High Risk

High Risk: The system involved is a law enforcement application (license plate recognition and tracking database), which is explicitly listed as a High Risk category under the EU AI Act.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: Flock Law Enforcement Camera System (Flock Safety)
• AI purpose: License Plate Recognition; Camera Tracking
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Surveillance technology developers, Flock Safety, Automated license plate reader (ALPR) developers
• Alleged deployer: Stalkers, Law enforcement, Coffee County Sheriff's Office (Georgia), Chris Ashley Rozar
• Alleged harmed parties: Women and girls, Women, Victims of stalking, Unnamed woman allegedly tracked by Chris Ashley Rozar, Privacy, Individuals whose license plate data were accessed for non-law-enforcement purposes, Individuals subjected to unauthorized surveillance

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Privacy

Reported: The report explicitly describes computer invasion of privacy.

Directly caused: The deputy faced two counts of Computer Invasion of Privacy and one count of Prohibited Use of Captured License Plate Data for tracking the victim's vehicle.

Inferred additional harm: The deputy accessed highly sensitive, real-time location history and vehicle movement data of the victim without authorization.

Psychological

Reported: The report explicitly describes psychological harm experienced by the victim.

Directly caused: The victim stated that the stalking and surveillance was 'terrifying and humiliating' for her.

Inferred additional harm: The victim likely suffered prolonged anxiety, fear, and stress due to being tracked across multiple locations by a law enforcement officer over several weeks.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly harmed: 1
• People reportedly exposed: 1

Potential causes

Management

• Failure to Monitor Deputy Behavior: Sheriff's office failed to detect unlawful database usage over several weeks.
• Inadequate System Access Reviews: Management lacked robust, proactive auditing of officer system queries.

Technology

• Flock ALPR Surveillance Capabilities: Flock automated license plate readers track vehicle movements across locations.
• Lack of Real-Time Access Controls: Systems allowed querying of plate data without active verification of purpose.

Data Inputs

• Captured License Plate Data: Continuous collection of vehicle location data enabled stalking behavior.
• GCIC Database Records Access: Access to Georgia Crime Information Center provided personal victim details.

Human Factors

• Intentional Misuse by Officer: Former deputy knowingly bypassed rules for personal harassment and stalking.
• Abuse of Authority: Officer used his position to surveil a citizen without her consent.

Process and Methods

• Inadequate Query Auditing: Lack of immediate automated alerts for non-law enforcement database queries.
• Insufficient Purpose Verification: System did not require active, verified case numbers before returning data.

Regulatory Environment

• Weak Enforcement of Privacy Laws: Existing computer privacy laws did not prevent the initial misuse of systems.
• Lack of External ALPR Oversight: No independent real-time regulatory oversight of local police ALPR usage.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The report is based on official court indictments and statements from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, providing clear facts about the misuse of the Flock camera system, the specific charges, and the impact on the victim.

A local Georgia deputy misused the Flock license plate reader system to stalk and harass a woman. While representing a serious abuse of authority and violation of civil rights, the incident remains a localized criminal matter with minor national security implications.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: United States
• Alleged perpetrator: Former Coffee County Sheriff's deputy

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The perpetrator has been arrested, indicted, and terminated, resolving the immediate threat, though systemic database misuse remains an ongoing policy concern.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The Flock camera system acted strictly as a tool queryable by the human operator, who made all decisions regarding whom to track.
• Novelty: Established threat. Insider misuse of law enforcement databases and surveillance tools for personal reasons is a well-documented and established threat pattern.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. The incident involved localized tracking of a single individual and did not target physical systems, critical infrastructure, or cause mass physical harm.
• Information security: Negligible. No classified networks, national intelligence collection methods, or large-scale disinformation operations were compromised or involved.
• Sovereignty: Minor. While a law enforcement officer violated his oath and abused government databases, this was a localized criminal act rather than a systemic compromise of national sovereignty or federal government functions.
• Economic security: Negligible. No strategic technologies, semiconductor supply chains, or financial systems were targeted or compromised.
• Societal stability: Minor. The incident represents a serious violation of individual privacy and civil rights, but the impact was localized to one victim and does not constitute population-scale algorithmic oppression.