Braselton, Georgia, Police Chief Allegedly Used Flock License-Plate Reader System to Stalk and Harass Multiple People

Michael Steffman, then police chief of Braselton, Georgia, allegedly used Flock automated license plate readers to stalk and harass multiple people. One woman said he used the cameras to track her location. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation arrested him on charges including stalking and misuse of the systems after an investigation lasting several months. He resigned from the department.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 2 Privacy & Security
• Primary risk subdomain: 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information

The police chief used the automated license plate recognition system to track the locations and movements of individuals without their consent, violating their privacy.

Additional risk subdomains

• 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation: The ALPR system was abused to conduct targeted stalking and harassment of specific individuals for personal reasons.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The stalking and harassment were caused by the intentional actions of a human (the police chief) abusing a deployed automated license plate recognition system.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 2 High Risk

High Risk: The system is a law enforcement application used for surveillance and identification, which falls under the High Risk category of the EU AI Act.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: Flock automated license plate readers (Flock Safety)
• AI purpose: License Plate Recognition; Smart Surveillance
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Surveillance technology developers, Flock Safety, Automated license plate reader (ALPR) developers
• Alleged deployer: Stalkers, Police officers, Police departments in the United States, Michael Steffman, Law enforcement, Braselton Police Department (Georgia)
• Alleged harmed parties: Women and girls, Women, Victims of stalking, Privacy, Individuals whose license plate data were accessed for non-law-enforcement purposes

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Civil rights

Reported: The report describes the chief violating his oath as a public officer and misusing surveillance systems to stalk citizens, which constitutes a civil rights violation.

Directly caused: The civil rights and privacy of the stalked individuals were directly violated by the unauthorized surveillance.

Inferred additional harm: The abuse of police databases to stalk citizens represents a severe violation of constitutional protections against unreasonable surveillance.

Privacy

Reported: The report explicitly describes the misuse of automated license plate recognition systems to stalk individuals, which is a direct privacy violation.

Directly caused: The location data and movements of multiple individuals were tracked without authorization or legal justification.

Inferred additional harm: The privacy of any individual passing through the town's ALPR camera zones was potentially compromised due to the lack of sufficient access controls preventing abuse.

Psychological

Reported: The report explicitly describes stalking and harassing communications, which inherently cause psychological harm.

Directly caused: Multiple individuals were subjected to stalking and harassment by the police chief using the surveillance system.

Inferred additional harm: The victims likely experienced significant emotional distress, anxiety, and fear for their safety due to being stalked by a law enforcement official.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly harmed: 2
• People reportedly exposed: 2

Potential causes

Management

• Lack of Leadership Oversight: No administrative oversight monitored the police chief's system usage.
• Delayed Incident Response: Investigation only began after a sheriff's office request months later.

Technology

• ALPR System Vulnerability: The ALPR technology allowed unauthorized tracking of individuals without alerts.
• Lack of Access Controls: Technology lacked restrictions to prevent misuse by high-ranking staff.

Data Inputs

• Unrestricted License Plate Data: Continuous collection of location data was accessible without active warrants.

Human Factors

• Abuse of Authority: The chief intentionally misused his position to stalk and harass victims.
• Violation of Public Oath: The officer knowingly violated his oath to protect, choosing personal malice.

Process and Methods

• Inadequate Audit Logs: No real-time monitoring or automated audits flagged suspicious search patterns.
• Deficient Verification Protocols: No process required secondary approval before querying plate history.

Regulatory Environment

• Weak ALPR Regulations: Lack of strict state or local legal frameworks governing ALPR data access.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The report clearly outlines the arrest of the police chief, the specific AI technology abused (ALPR), and the charges of stalking and harassment. While the exact number of victims is described as 'multiple' rather than a specific integer, the core facts of the AI safety incident are unambiguous.
• Ambiguities identified: The exact number of victims and the duration of the stalking are not specified.
• Alternative interpretations: None. The event is clearly a case of human abuse of a surveillance AI tool.

A local police chief in Georgia was arrested for abusing automated license plate recognition cameras to stalk and harass individuals. The incident represents a localized abuse of surveillance technology and insider threat, resulting in minor national security implications that are manageable under standard state law enforcement procedures.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: United States
• Alleged perpetrator: Individual

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The immediate threat is resolved with the arrest and resignation of the official, though systemic insider threat risks remain.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The ALPR system acted strictly as a surveillance tool under the direct query and monitoring control of the police chief.
• Novelty: Established threat. The abuse of database and surveillance tools by law enforcement personnel is a well-documented and established threat.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. No kinetic threat, physical harm, or critical infrastructure disruption occurred during this incident.
• Information security: Negligible. No compromise of national intelligence, classified models, or foreign information operations occurred.
• Sovereignty: Minor. A local government official violated his oath of office and abused public systems, but this did not disrupt core national government operations or sovereignty.
• Economic security: Negligible. The incident has no direct impact on national economic stability, strategic industries, or technological competitive advantage.
• Societal stability: Minor. The incident involved localized violations of civil rights and privacy through unauthorized surveillance, but did not threaten national societal stability.