Calgary Malls Deployed Facial Recognition without Customer Consent

Facial recognition (FRT) was reportedly deployed in some Calgary-area malls to approximate customer age and gender without explicit consent, which a privacy expert warned was a cause for concern.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 2 Privacy & Security
• Primary risk subdomain: 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information

The incident involves the unauthorized tracking and inference of shoppers' demographic data (age and gender) using facial recognition software without their consent.

Additional risk subdomains

• 7.4 Lack of transparency or interpretability: The software was deployed secretly in the background of digital directories without any public notification or signage.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The privacy risk and lack of consent were caused by the intentional decision of mall management to deploy the facial recognition system post-deployment.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 2 High Risk

High Risk: The report describes the use of facial recognition software in public retail spaces, which falls under biometric identification applications that have significant implications for fundamental rights and privacy.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: MappedIn directory software (MappedIn)
• AI purpose: Face Recognition; Gender Identification
• Behaviour type: Autonomous
• Alleged developer: unknown
• Alleged deployer: Cadillac Fairview
• Alleged harmed parties: Market Mall goers, Chinook Centre mall goers

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Substantial. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Substantial, indirect Minor
• Psychological: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Civil rights

Reported: Yes, the report explicitly mentions concerns regarding civil liberties and the ability to exercise rights.

Directly caused: The deployment of facial recognition tracking without consent or opt-out options directly impacted shoppers' civil liberties and right to privacy.

Inferred additional harm: We infer that thousands of shoppers had their basic civil rights to privacy and informed consent violated during the months the software was active.

Privacy

Reported: Yes, the report explicitly describes privacy concerns regarding the collection of facial recognition data without consent.

Directly caused: The MappedIn software tracked shoppers' ages and genders using facial recognition without notifying them or obtaining consent.

Indirectly caused: Privacy advocates noted that the collected data could potentially be combined with other sources like Wi-Fi logs to create detailed consumer profiles.

Inferred additional harm: It is likely that thousands of mall visitors had their biometric and demographic privacy violated without their knowledge or consent.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly exposed: 1

Potential causes

Management

• Prioritizing Tracking Over Privacy: Management deployed tracking to analyze behavior and improve experience.
• Nondisclosure of Tech Use: Management kept software use proprietary and did not notify shoppers.

Technology

• Facial Recognition Software: MappedIn software ran in background of digital directories to track shoppers.
• Accidental Interface Exposure: A browser window was left open, exposing the background tracking software.

Data Inputs

• Biometric Data Processing: Directory cameras captured shoppers' faces to predict age and gender.
• Lack of Data Verification: No independent way to verify that images were not being saved or stored.

Human Factors

• No Shopper Consent: Shoppers were not given an opportunity to opt in or opt out of tracking.
• Lack of Public Awareness: General public was unaware of being surveilled while using directories.

Process and Methods

• No Privacy Impact Assessment: The mall operator failed to conduct or share privacy impact assessments.
• Inadequate Notification Signs: Only generic CCTV signs were posted without explaining facial recognition.

Regulatory Environment

• Regulatory Loophole: Alberta's PIPA allowed tracking because images were not saved or stored.
• Lack of Corporate Transparency: Private corporations are legally allowed to keep proprietary operations private.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The reports provide clear, consistent details about the deployment of the facial recognition software, the malls involved, the parent company's response, and the specific privacy concerns raised by advocates. There are no major conflicting accounts, and the technical function of the software is explicitly stated by both the mall and the software developer.
• Ambiguities identified: The exact number of shoppers tracked and whether any other data points were secretly collected remain unverified, though the mall denies storing images.
• Alternative interpretations: The mall argues that because images are not stored, no personal information is collected, meaning no privacy violation occurred. However, privacy advocates interpret the real-time biometric processing itself as a privacy violation.

The unauthorized deployment of facial recognition software in Canadian malls by Cadillac Fairview highlights growing concerns over commercial biometric surveillance and privacy. While it does not pose a direct threat to physical or state security, it represents a notable challenge to civil liberties and societal privacy norms, requiring regulatory oversight.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: Canada
• Alleged perpetrator: Cadillac Fairview

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. Represents an ongoing regulatory and strategic debate around biometric privacy rather than an active national security crisis.
• Autonomy: Full autonomy. The software automatically captured, processed, and analyzed facial features to determine age and gender without human intervention.
• Novelty: Evolved capability. Demonstrates an advanced, commercialized deployment of real-time facial analysis in public-facing spaces, representing an evolution in surveillance.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. No physical threats, kinetic actions, or critical infrastructure impacts were reported in connection with this commercial deployment.
• Information security: Negligible. No evidence of foreign intelligence operations, classified data theft, or state-sponsored disinformation campaigns.
• Sovereignty: Negligible. The incident was confined to private commercial properties and did not impact government operations, elections, or state sovereignty.
• Economic security: Negligible. No disruption to critical financial systems, strategic supply chains, or national technological advantages.
• Societal stability: Minor. Unconsented biometric tracking of mall visitors raised significant civil liberties and privacy concerns, though manageable within existing regulatory frameworks.