Alleged Deepfake of Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong Falsely Shows Him Endorsing Commercial Products

A deepfake video falsely depicting Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong endorsing commercial products circulated online in December 2023. Wong publicly denied the endorsement, warning that scammers had used AI-generated deepfake technology to impersonate him. The manipulated media aimed to mislead the public into believing he promoted fraudulent investments. Wong urged vigilance against AI-driven scams and encouraged reporting through the ScamShield Bot on WhatsApp.

Risk classification

• Primary risk domain: 4 Malicious actors
• Primary risk subdomain: 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation

The incident involves the creation of deepfake videos impersonating a public official to falsely endorse commercial products, which is a clear case of using AI for scams and targeted manipulation.

Additional risk subdomains

• 3.1 False or misleading information: The deepfake video generated false and misleading information regarding the Deputy Prime Minister's endorsement of commercial products.

Causal factors

• Entity: Human
• Intent: Intentional
• Timing: Post-deployment

The risk was caused by human malicious actors who intentionally created and distributed deepfake videos using post-deployment AI generation tools to scam the public.

EU AI Act risk tier

• Risk tier: 3 Limited Risk

Risk Level 3. Limited Risk: The incident involves 'AI-generated content such as deepfakes' which require transparency obligations so users are aware they are interacting with synthetic media.

AI system and alleged parties

• AI system: None named
• AI purpose: Deepfake Video Generation; Voice Generation
• Behaviour type: Tool
• Alleged developer: Unknown voice cloning technology developers, Unknown deepfake technology developers
• Alleged deployer: Unknown scammers, Scammers impersonating Lawrence Wong
• Alleged harmed parties: Lawrence Wong, General public of Singapore

Harm severity

Severity ratings are based on this scale.

Highest direct severity in any category: Minor. Severity is scored from Negligible to Catastrophic in each harm category, for harm the reports describe as caused directly or indirectly by the AI system.

• Physical: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Infrastructure: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Property: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Financial: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Environmental: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Malicious content: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Differential treatment: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Civil rights: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Democracy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Privacy: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Psychological: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible
• Epistemic: direct Minor, indirect Negligible
• Child sexual exploitation and abuse: direct Negligible, indirect Negligible

Malicious content

Reported: Yes, the report describes the creation of malicious deepfake videos.

Directly caused: Deepfake videos of Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong endorsing commercial products were created and circulated online.

Epistemic

Reported: Yes, the report describes false information and deepfakes circulating online.

Directly caused: Deepfake videos falsely depicted the Deputy Prime Minister endorsing commercial products, creating false beliefs about his endorsements.

Inferred additional harm: The circulation of high-quality deepfakes of government officials could degrade public trust in official communications and online information.

People affected

• Occurrences reported: 1
• People reportedly harmed: 1
• People reportedly exposed: 1

Potential causes

Management

• Reactive Safety Measures: Platforms respond to reports rather than proactively preventing deepfakes.

Technology

• Generative AI Deepfakes: AI tools used to create realistic fake videos of public figures.
• Easy Profile Duplication: Platforms lack automated blocks against copying public profile details.

Data Inputs

• Harvested Public Media: Publicly available photos and videos used to train and generate deepfakes.

Human Factors

• Lack of Public Discernment: Online users struggle to distinguish real videos from AI-generated deepfakes.
• Trust in Public Figures: Scammers exploit high public trust in government officials.

Process and Methods

• Weak Identity Verification: Social media platforms do not strictly verify identities of public figures.
• Slow Content Moderation: Delayed detection and removal of fake accounts and deepfake videos.

Regulatory Environment

• Inadequate AI Regulation: Lack of robust legal frameworks targeting commercial deepfake scams.

Information quality

• Classification confidence: High
• Reason for confidence: The report clearly states that the videos of the Deputy Prime Minister endorsing products were deepfakes and details his public response. There is little ambiguity about the nature of the impersonation, though the specific AI tools used to generate the deepfakes are not identified.
• Ambiguities identified: The specific AI software or platform used to generate the deepfakes is not identified in the report.
• Alternative interpretations: None.

The incident involved deepfake videos of Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and other ministers falsely endorsing commercial products. While targeting high-level government officials, the activity was identified as a commercial scam rather than a state-sponsored influence operation, resulting in minor national security implications.

• Overall national security impact: Minor
• Scope: Single nation
• Primary target: Singapore
• Alleged perpetrator: Unknown

Threat characteristics

• Imminence: Long-term. The incident represents an ongoing strategic concern regarding deepfakes and public figure impersonation, rather than an active, immediate crisis.
• Autonomy: Human-controlled. The deepfake generation tools were used as a capability by human operators who directed the content creation and dissemination.
• Novelty: Established threat. Impersonation campaigns targeting Singaporean politicians have occurred since at least 2017, making this an established threat type.

Impact by dimension

• Physical security: Negligible. No physical security, kinetic threats, or critical infrastructure compromise reported in this incident.
• Information security: Minor. Deepfake videos impersonated the Deputy Prime Minister and other officials, representing an information threat, though primarily aimed at commercial scams rather than state-sponsored information warfare.
• Sovereignty: Minor. The incident targeted the Deputy Prime Minister and other ministers, requiring public denials, but did not disrupt core government operations, elections, or sovereignty.
• Economic security: Minor. The deepfakes were used for commercial product endorsement scams targeting citizens, representing minor economic fraud risks but no systemic threat to financial systems.
• Societal stability: Minor. While the impersonation of multiple high-profile ministers could erode public trust in official communications, it did not lead to civil unrest or systemic human rights violations.